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The object of this paper will be to give a brief
summary of the legislaLion of Congress affecting the Mormon people,with the principal cases arising under these
laws and the important constitutional questions involved.
Perhaps no epoch in the history of our jurisprudence
more forcibly illustrates the might and majesty of the
law-certainly no similarand possibly no more remarkable
conditions have ever been the subject of its operation.
It is safe to say that the history of no country furnishes such an example of complete revolution in the social
conditions of any sect. The practice which this legislation was designed to prevent was only participated in by,
a comparatively small portion of the Mormon people,and
they acted under a claim of religious right,but the operation of the law.r has been so~farreaching

as to affect thi,_

entire people.
Can anything be more anomulous than to see men who
have been convicted of crimeconfined in state's prison,
with hair shorn and arrayed in

convict's garb,emerging

from their prison cells at the expiration of their terma
of sentence and taken by the hand by the most prominent
and influential membei-sbf the conmmunitywho sustain them

in positions of responsibilty ad trust,where they receive the confidence of all classes of peoplJ. Hundreds
of such cases have occurred in Utahbut the operation of
the law has bserl most

effective and complete.

On account of the peculiar social conditions 2xistin Utahin the year 18P2 Congress passed "An act to punish and prevent the practice of polygamy in the Territories and other places and disapproving and annulling certain acts of the legislative assembly of the Territory of
Utah",which in

addition to making polyamyv

a crime and

prescribing a penalty therefor,liimited the capacity of
religious and charitable corporations and associations to
hold real property to the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars.
This act remained a dead letter

on the statute book

until the year 1878,when George Reynolds .,ias convicted of
polygamy in

the Third District Court of Utah.

The judg-

ment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory
and the case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States;the prisoner claiming that the legislation under
which he vwas convicted -ras

in violation of the first

a-

mendment to the constitution of Lhe United States,.rhich
provides that Congress shall make no law rsepecting an

establishment or free exercise of religion. No better discussion of the subject can be made than is contained in
the following quotations from the opinion of Chief .ustice Waite in the decisioh of the Reynolds case:
"It

is

impossible to believe that the constitutional

gauranty of religious freedom was intended to prohibit
legislation in respect to the most important feature of
social life. Marriage,while from its very nature a sacred
obligation, is,nevertheless,in most civilized nations,a
civil contract,and usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be built,and out of its fruits
spring social relations and social obligations and dutieq,
with which government
In

is

necessarily required to deal.xxx

our opinion the statute immediately under consid-

eration is within the legislative power of Congress. It
is

constituttonal and valid as prescribing a rule of ac-

tion for all

those residing in

the Territories,and in

places over which the United States have exclusive control. This being so,the only question which remains is,
whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion
are excepted from the operation of the statute.

If

they

arethen those who do not make polygamy a part of their
religious belief may be found guilty and p-unishd,while

those who do must be acquited and go free. This would be
introducing a now element
made for the government
interfere witli

into criminal law. Laws are

of nations,and while they cannot

mere religious belief and opinions,thiey

may with practices, x x x
"A criminal intent is generally an element

of crime,

but every man is presumed to intend the necessary and
legitimate consequences of what he knowingly does. Here
the accused knew he had been once married,and that his
first wife was living. He also knew that his second marriage was forbidden by law. Whentherefore,he married a
second time,he is presumed to have intended to break the
law. And the breaking of the law is the crime. Every act
necessary to constitute the crime was knowingly doneand
the crime wasthereforekno ingl-- conmitted."
3efore the Reynolds' trialan important act had been
passed by Congress which greatly restricted the few powers of local self-government
Utah. Its full effect

enjoyed by the pcople of

can only be aprrediated by remem-

bering the limited degree of sovereignty possessed by the
people under a Territorial form of government. The Governor,the Secretary of the Territory,all the judgesthe
United States Attorney and Marshal,and many other officers are appointed by the President

of the United States,

and are

in

no way responsible to the people.

This "Act

in

relation to the courts and judicial officers in the Territory of Utah",was apporved June 23rd, 1874.

It abolish-

ed the offices of Territorial Marshal and Attorney General,and conferred the powers and duties of these officers upon the United States Marshal and United States
Attorney;regulated the jurisdiction of DistrictProbate
and Justice's
the

drawing

Courts and made such provision in
of -rand

and petit

juries

regard to

as,with an amend-

ment made by Congress 1887,left tihe majority of the population of the Territory without representation on juries;
took from the people the power to elect officers to which
they were entitled to represent them in the highest
courts of the Territory.
This act was followed in the year 1882 by the so
called "Edmunds
fifty

Law"

entitled

three hundred and fifty

of the United States,in

"An act

to amend section

two of the Revised Statutes

reference

to bigamy,and for other

purposes". This act,very comprehensive in its scope,defined and prescribed penalties

for the crimes

of polygamy

and unlawful cohabitation;required additional qualifications for jurors serving in such cases;legitimated the
offsrring of rolygamous marriages;disqualified polyga-

mists to votehold office,or serve on juries,4nd provided
for a conmission of five persons to be appointed by the
President of the UMited Stateswho should have povver to
appoint all the registration and election officers in the
Territory. Section nine of the ".Edmunds Act"

reads

as

follo -s:
"Section 9. That all
officeu

tha registration and election

of every description in the Territory of Utah

are hereby declared vacantand each and every duty relating
tions,the

to the registration
receiving

of voters,the

conduct

of elec-

or rejection of votes,and the can-

vassing and return of the same,and the issuing of certificates or other evidence of election in said Territory,
shall,-until other provision be made by the Legislative
Assembly of said Territory as is hereinafter by this section provided,be performed under the existing laws of the
United States and of said Territory by proper persons,
who shall

be appointed to execut-e such offices

and per-

form such duties by a board of five persons,to be appointed by the President,by

and with the advice

of the Senate. x x x The canvass

and consent

and return of all the

votes cast at elections in said Territory for members of
the Legislative Assembly there!of shall

also be returned

to said boardwhich shall canvass all such returns and
issue certificates

of election to ,those persons whobeing

eligible for such election,shall appoar to have been lawfully

shall

certificates

elect cd,which

dence of the right of such persons to sit
bly: PROVIDED,

only evi-

be the
in

such assem-

said board of five persons

That

not

shall

exclude any person otherwise eligible to vote from the
polls on account of an.r opinion such person may entertain
on the subject of bigamy or polygamynor shall they refuse to count any such vote on account
the person casting

it

of the opinion of

on the subject of bigamy or polyg-

amy".
It seems very evident from this section that
commission
prior

thereby created had but one duty to perform

to election,and that

-,ras to appoint

the registra-

tion and election officers to fill the vacancies
by the act.

the

After performing

this

duty,the

created

commission was

functus officio until called upon to canvass and return
the votes for members

of the Le!rislature.

Instead of per-

forming this plain and simple duty,the commission proceeded to constitute itself a coordinate department of
the Territorial government,by making rules and r gulations for the registration of voters and the conducting

of elections,hearing appealsand acting as if vested with
legislative and

judicial powers. By prescribing an oath

to be taken b-, persons applying for registration an ex
post facto operation was given to the law. Not only then
polygamists but all persons who had ever occupied that
status,although they might have discontinued the practice
and abandoned tha polygamous relation,were

excluded from

voting and holding office. Applicants for registration
were accorded the privilege of appealing from the decision of the registration officer to the cormissionfrom
which the oath and rules debarring them from exercising
the elective franchise,had eminated.
It seems strange that the cormission could so mistake its powers and duties. They were clearly defined in
the law as extending only to the appointment of registration and election officers,the canvass and return of
votes cast for members of the Legislative Assemblyand
the issuance of certificates of election to such persons
as their might find entitled to the same.

If

the language

of the law was not sufficiently clear as to the intention
of Congress,and especially of the distinguished author of
the actthe

debates in

passage of the bill

the Senate at the time of the

showed that the idea of the commiss-

ioners having an% such powers as tiley a~ssmed to exer-

cise was never contemplated by Congress. A5 reported in
the Congressional Record,1882,Volume 13,Part 2,page 1156,
Senator Edmunds said:
"As to the qualification of electors,the board of
five persons are not by this bill vested with any power
at all;they are left exactly where they are left by tie
other laws of the United States and the laws of the Terii

ritory of Utah.
And the laws of the Territory of Utah and of the
United States made ample provision for the registration
of voters and the regulation and conducting of elections
in the Territory.
Under this section of one of the most important acts
in the history of the Territory,a number of test cases
arose,upon statements of fact which are very similar.
The cases were carried to the Supreme Court of the United
States,submitted upon t1-e same briefs and decided by the
court in one opinion.
Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15-47.
The plaintiff Murphy was deprived of the privilege
of voting,under the legislation of the commissionhe having once been a polygamist but not occupying that status

10.

at the time he applied to register. He sued the cormnissioners,countv registration officersand the deputy registrar in the precinct in which he resided and by the
laws of the Territory was entitled to vote. Judgment was
rendered for the defendants in the District Court and was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the Territory. Mr. Justice Matthews,in delivering tha opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States,said:
"An examination of the ninth section of the act of
March 22nd,

1882,providing for the appointment and pre-

scribing the duties ahd powers of that boardshows that
they have no functions whatever in respect to the registration of voters,except

the appointment

of officers in

place of those previously authorizedwhoze offices are by
that section of the law declared to be vacant;and the persong appointed to succeed them are not subject to the direction and control of the board,but are required,until
other provision be made by the Legislative Assembly of
the Territoryto perform all duties relating to the registration of voters

'under the existing laws of the Uni-

ted States and of said Territory'. The board are not
authorized to prescribe rules for governing them in the
performance of these duties,much less to prescribe any

1

.

qualifications for voters as a condition of registration.
The proviso in the section does indeed declare 'that said
board of five persons shall not exclude any person,otherwise eligible to vote,from the polls on account of any
opinion such person may entertain on the subject of bigamy or polygamy',but in the absence of any general and
express power over the subject of declaring the qualifications of votersit is not a just inference from the
words of this proviso that it was intended to admit by
implication the existence of any authority in the board
to exclude from registration or the right to vote, any
person whateveror in any manner to define and declare
what the qualifications of a voter shall be#
"It

x x x

follows that thu rules promulgated by the board,

prescribing the form of oath to be exacted 'of persons
offering to register as voters and which constitute the
directions under which it is alleged the registration officers actedwere without force and no effect can be
given them."
It was contended by the appellants that Section
Eight of the Edmunds Act violated that provision of the
Constitution of the United States which prohibits Cop- gress from passing any bill of attainder or ex post facto

120

law.
That Congress has no more power to pass a bill of
attainder or ex post facto law for the Territory of Utah
than for the State of New York,there can be no question.
Section eighteen hundred and ninety one of the Revised
Statutes of the United States provides that "fThe Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not
locally inapplicable,shall have the same force and effect
within all the organized Territories,and. in every Territory hereafter organizedas elsewhere *ithin the Unite.
States .
Sre also Dred v. Sandford 19 Howard, 449-50.
It

i.- settled bir the Supreme Court of the United

States,that the deprivation of the right to vote or hold
office may be punishmentthe circumstances attrnding and
causes of the deprivation determining that fact.

A statutb

inflicting such punishment without legal trial and convictionis a bill of pains and penalties or a bill of
attainder,prohibited by the Constitution of the United
States. An ex post facto law is one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time
it was cormitted,or imposes an additional punishment to
that then prescribeui,or changes the rules of evidence by

139

which less or different testimony is

sufficient to con-

vict than was then required.
Cu nings v. Missouri, 4 Wale 277.
Ex parte Garland

4 Wal. 233.

Huber v. Riley 3 P.T.Smith 112.
The foregoing priicirles senmed to decide! th3 Toint
aj contended for by the appellant Murphy that section
Eight of the Edmtuds law was pinatory,and,as

construed by

the commission constituted a bill of attainder. Whatever
the power of Congress might be to prescribe the qualification of votersit could not,witlout trial and convictionunder cover of such legislation,inflict punishment
upon a citizen for an offence previously committed. So
soon as the fact appeared that the object of the law was
punatorythe constitutional inhabition applied.
"In the construction of a statuteevery part of it
must be viewed in connection with the whole,so as to make
all its parts harmonious,if practicable,and give a sensible and intelligent effect to each".
Dwarris on Statutes,
Lord Mansfield says: "That all

144.
laws which relate to

the same subject,notwithstanding some of them may be expired or not noticed,must b_ taken to be one act and con-

14.

strued consistently."
Chancellor Kent says: "It is to be inferred that a
code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by
one spirit and policy,and was intended to be consistent
and harmonious in its several parts."
1 Kent's Comrnentaries, 463.
The question was,did the purity of the eldetive
franchise or the punishment of bigarnists and

polygamists

inspire the enactment of Section Eight of the Edmunds Law?
If intended for the purpose first named.,would

it not have

been made an amendment to that section of the organic act
which relates exclusively to the qualifications of voters
in Utah,instead of being made a part of an act which created the crime of polygamy and prescribed a penalty
therefor? If the purpose of Section Eight was to preserve
the purity of the elective franchiseby preventing it
from being exercised by persons practicing polygamy,the
proviso of Section Nines-would have no place in the law.
The Supreme Court of the United. States upheld the
statute and in its d-ecisionsaid:
"In our opinion, every man is a bigamist or polygamist in the sense of this jcction of the actho,having
pi-evi-usly marriedhas one wife still living,and having

-

15.

anoLher at the time when he presents Liimself to claim
registration as a vote-,still maintaIns that relation to
a plurality of wives,although,from the date of the passage of the act of March 22nd, 1882,u-ntil the day he
offers to register and votehe may not in fact have cohabited with more than one woman. Without regard to the
question whether at the time he entered into such a.relation,it was a prohibited and punishable offenceor whether by reason of lapse of time sInce its commission a prosecution for it may not be barred,if he still maintains
the relationhe is a bigamist or polygamistbecause that
is the status which the fixed habit and practice of his
living has established* He has a plurality of wives -more than ohe woman whom he recognizes as a wife,of whose
children he is the acknowledged fatherand whom,with
their children,he maintains as a family of which he is
the head. And this status as to several wives may well
continue to exist as a practical relation,although for a
period he may not in

fact cohabit with more than one;for

that is quite consistent with the constant recognition
of the same relation to many,accompanied with the possible Intention to renew cohabitation with one oL- more of
the others when it may be convenient."

16.

Section Three of the Edyntnds Act provides "That

if

any male person in a Territory or other place over which
the United States have exclusive jurisdlction,hereafter
cohabits with more than one woman,he shall be guilty of
a misdemeanorand on conviction thereof shall be punished
by a fine of not more than Three Hundred Dollars,or by
imprlsonment for not more than Six months,or by both said
punishments,in the discretion of the court.
In

1885,

Angus M. Cannon was

indicted and convicted

in the Third District Court of Utah Territory for unlawquestion
ful cohabitation under this section. The importantA in the
case was the meaning of the word 'cohabit"

as used in

that section. On the trialthe defendant offered to prove
that while lie still continued to reside under the same
roof with the women named in the indictment as his wives,
eating at their respective tables alternatelyand acknowledging said women as wives,upon the passage of the
Edmunds Act he had changed his mode of living by non-access to the beds ofsaid

wonien,and had declared his in-

tention not to violate the law. This evidence was excludedand the aefendant excepted*
The Court charged the jury:"If you believe from the
evidencebeyond a reasonable doubtthat the defendant

17.

lived in the same house wlth Amanda Cannon and Clara CO
Cannonthe women named in the indictmentand ate at their
respeutive tables one third of the time or thereabouts,
that h- held them out to the world by his language or
conduct or by both as his wives,you should find him
guilty." This instruction was excepted to by the defendantv
The court refused to charge the jury as follows:
"Sexual intercourse is a necessary element of the crime
of cohabitation,and if the jury find the defendant has
rt~

I'd sexual intercourse with both Clara C. and Amanda

Ca~r.

nce the passage of the Edxnunds Act and within

the dates named in the indictment,then they should acquit
the defendant.' Defendant excepted to the refusal of the
court to give this instr-action.
Mr.

Cannon was convicted,and the case was ca.ried to

the Supreme Court of the United Stateswhere the decision of the trial court was sustained In a short opinion,
in

which the court decided that nexual intercourse was

not a necessar'y ingredlant of the crime prohibited by
this section. It seemed tQ base its decision upon the
theory that sufficient acts of the defendant had been
shown to evidence a "holding out"%-Oo Oie world" of these

18

women as wives,whici constituted the offence.
Cannon v# United States,

116 UeS.

55.

Justices Miller and Field dissented in the following
concise statement of the law: "I think that the act of
Congress,when prohibiting conlabitation with more than or
womanmeant iulawful,habitual sexual intercourse.
"It is ir my opinion a stralned construction ofra
highly penal statiite to hold that a man can be guilty,
under that statute,without the accompaniment of sexual
connect ion,
"I know of no instance in which the word "cohabitationw has been used to describe a criminal offence where
it did not imply sexual intercourse."
This view in regard to the interpretation of this
statute would certainly be favored from a reading of the
lawparticularly those clauses in regard to the legitimating of children and the power of the President to
grant amnesty in cases of marriages contracted before the
passage of Lhe law. It

would seem that it

was not the in-

tention of Congress to compel the desertion and abandonment of these women and their childrenbut rather to im
pose a duty upon the man to provide for them,but to refrain from contracting future marriagesand from cohabit-

190

ing with plural wives. Had a less strict construction
been placed on this act,the results accomplished might
not have been the same# But I cannot help thinking that
the fundamental principle of law was correctly stated by
the minority of the Court,*
A discus3ion of the necessity for such a law or the
benefits

'o

be derived from its

passagewould be eniArelyr

out of place in a treatise of this characterbut whether
or not it woiild have failed in the ultimate object aimed
at by Congress,certainly should not,in justice or lawbe
consIdered by the court in its construction. It would
seem that the construction given td this statute --

one

of a highly penal character and demanding the strictest
construction --

was rather in the nature of an amendment

to/the lawthan an attempt to bring it

within the inten-

tion of Congress as evidenced by the actand it has the
appearance of an effort to adapt the law to the exigencies of the occaslon.
WebsLer and other- lexicographers substantially agree
in two definitions of the word "cohabit". (1).
with.

To inhabit or reside

in

company or in

"To dwell

the same

place or country. (2). To dwell or live together as husband and wife.,

If

the court had adopted tho first

mean-

20#

ing as evincing the intention of Congress,it would have
led to the most absurd consequences. That definition must
be rejected as having no application to the word as used
in this statute. It implies no intimacy -- no relation
r~iquiring legal regulation -- certainly no restriction on
account of the difference in sex. The other definition
implies intimacy -- sexual intimacy-- and a degree of it
illustrated by the dwelling together of husband and wife.
This statute must have been to prevent the liting together of an adult male person with more tham one woman in
the same intimacy as is usual between husband and vife.
All cohabitation which the law deals with is sexual
cohabitation. The law regulates and draws inferences from
it,because it imports a living together in the habitual
practice of sexual intercotrse. No intimacy of the sexes
is offensive to the public nor could be criminal under
the statute,unless it includes in fact or b,, necessary
prest.iption sexual intercourse.
The word "cohabit" has nevr be-n used in anyr crimi-nal
law, to mean anything less than actual sexual intercours,
and if

the idea of habit and frequency implied in

th

wqrd

(as distinguished from isolated acts),was not requirod,
the wo'd "cohabitation" 'in such statutes could be chang-

21.

ed'to'"sexual intercourse" and the term "lewd or lascivious c,)_'abitation",can be paraphrased to read ulascivious
and habitual or frequent sexual intercourse" ,without

any

change of signification. When in a civil case a question
arises as to the consumation of a marriage,the term "cohabitation, has been deemed as an equivalent of sexual
relations,and could have no other meaning. So if the
question is whetler a malitall offence has been condoned,,
Ghe cohabitation after knowledge of the offence means
sexual intercourse only.
Drum v.
It

is

Drum 4 Paige 425.

not necessary that tho wife shall withdraw

from the house.

She may be unable to do so,and it

is

enough that she cease cohabiting with the husband by
withdrawing from his bed*
The popular use of the wordespecially when applied
to the relation of the sexes,sonforms to this meaning,and
whether we look to judicial procaedings,lexicographers or
connor. spech,the same significance

is

found. Had Con-

Press intended to use the word in a new signification,
would not a definition have been given to carry out the
intent?
It seems misleading to asume that this statute re-

22.

fers onl:r to cohabitation under the marriage relation,and
the word "cohabit"

that

relates only to those associating

under the form of a marriage contract,-- a necessary inference from the decision of the cout*
tion ;'i2ats the void marriage

rel3tion

of !,*e offence and a part of its
treating
resu

it
rptions

Such an assunpas

definition,

a constituent
instead of

only as a mattor of evidence tending to raise
of fact going to establish the offence.

Cohabitation does not only mean the living together
of husband and wife,but the living together of a man and
woman as husband and wife.

It

refers to the manner of

living and not the, contractand therefore includes husband and wife and all men and women who assume their
habits of living.

Unless this

is

the meaning of the term,

statutes against lewd and lascivious cohabitation could
not be enforced,unless the prosecutor could show a void
1a1ital contract o" relation,and such statutes would fail
to reach the cases intended to b) included* In such cases
it

is

relations

the habit

and freq,7ency of the vi3it

and sexual

which makes the cohabitation.
By the decisions of the courts,the term "any male

person" in this section was limited to the term "any male
person wvho in a polygamous relation, etc." Such a con-

23.

struction would not only incorporate new words and incorporate a new meaning,but would give an ex post facto application to the law,by making a past act an essential
part of an offence to which. a new punishment was annexed,
and would revive past offences,though prosecutions lvore
barred b-

the ,;tatute of limitatioi',

The maxtmrim punishment prescribed for the offence
of unlawful cohabitation was six months imprisonment
the Peni!:entiary and $300.

fine.

in

Thinking this penalty

too slightthe prosecuting officers und~rtook to increase
it in a rather singular way. Lor~nzo Snow was indicted
separately in

the First District Court of the Territory

of Utah on 'liree

indictments for unlawful cohabitation,

covering together a continuous pe.-iod of time,eech covering a different partbut
the indictments

tho !hree

parts being continuous;

being found at the samo tfmTe,br the same

-rand\ jiu ",on th; same oath and on or - examination of the
same ":itnessescoverinr
cases were tried in

thewhole continuous time. The

the invel'se order f u

t -e several crimes charged w,oe cuf:wJe.
of each of the tvo latter

.1,at in which

On the trial

che.-fs,the defendant entered

a special plea of Autrifois Convict,.vhich was overruled.
One judgment was entered in,the three cases. It first

24 .

imposed a term of imprisonment and fine;it then imposed
two other successive terms of imprisonment and fines,each
to begin at the expiration of the last preceding sentence.
The judgment

set foi-6h the time embraced by each indict-

mentand specified each of the three punishments as being
imposed in respect of a specified one of the indictments.
The defendantLorenzo Snow,v s given a maximum punishment in

each of, the three counts..After serving his

term of imprisonment and paying the fine imposed on the
first count,he applied to the District Court for a writ
of habeas corpusclaiming that he had been convicted
three times for the same offense;that three punishments
had been imposed therefor;that he had satisfied the full
penalty of the law and was being punished the second time
for one and the same offense. The writ was refused and
an appeal taken to the Supreme Court of the United States,
there was but one entire offense for the

which holj

'h--t

continuous

timeand ordered the discharge of the prisoner.

Mr. Justice Blatchford.,after explaining the theory
of unlawful cohabitation as laid down in the Cannon case,
said:
"There was but a single offense cor nitued prior to
the time the indictments were found. This appears on the

25.

face of the judgment. It refers to the indictments as
found

'for the crime of inlawful cohabitation

conmitted'

'during the time' stated,divided into three periods according

to each indictment.

For so much of the offense as

covered each of these periods the defendant is,according
to the judgmentto be imprisoned for six months and to
pay a

fine of $300.

The division of the two years and

eleVen months is wholly arbitrary. On the same principle,
there might have been an indictment
thirty

five monthswith

imprisonment

covering

each of the

for seventeen years

and a half and fines amounting to $10,500. or even an indictment covering every week,with imprisonment for seventy four years and fines amounting to $44,400. and so on
ad infinitem for smaller periods of time. It is to prevent such an application of penal laws,that the rule has
obtained that a continuing offense of the character of
the one in

this

case can be committed but once,for

the

purpose of indictment or prosecution,rrior to the time
the prosecution
In

is

instituted."

Re Snow,

A thorough

120 U.S.

27zt.

and able discussion of this subject

Lord Mansfield is given in

the cas3 of Crepps V.

by

Durden,

Cowper 640,quoted from at length in the opinion of the

26.

court,
The third section of an act of Congress of March 3rd,
1887,entitled "An act to amend an act entitled 'An
amend section fifty

three hundred and fifty

act to

two of the

Revised Statutes of the United States,in reference to
bigamy and for other purposes," provides:
"That whoever commits adultery shall be punished b,7
imprisonment in the Penitentiarynot exceeding three
years;and when the act is committed between a married woman and a man who is unmarried.,both parties to such act
shall be deemed guilty of adultery;and when such act is
committed between a married manand a woman who is unmarried,the man shall be deemed guilty of adultery."
Acting upon the theory that sexual intercourse was
not an essential element of unlawful cohabitationand
perhaps stimulated by a desire for gloryeasily obtained
by prosecuting an unpopular sectthe representatives of
the government

devised a new scheme for adding to the

burdens already carried by those offending against this
legislation. Although forbidden to segregate the offense
of unlawful cohabitation,they proceeded to indict for the
latter offense,and then indicted for adultery occuring
between the same parties during the period covered by the
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cohabitation. This was somewhat consistent with the decision of the court in the Cannon casefrom which it seemed
that 'holding out' the wives constituted the offense of
cohabitation,instead of sexual intercourse.
On the 27th, day of September,1888,two indictments
were foundby the same grand jury,against Hans Nielson in
the First District Court of Utah Territoryone for unlawful cohabitation under section three of the Edmunds
Act,and the other for adultery under the section last
quoted* The first indictment charged that on the 15th,
day of October,1888,and continuously from that time to
the 13th,

of May,1388,the said Nielson conmitted the of-

fense of unlawful cohabitation with two women named I
therein. The second indictment charged the said Nielson
with having conmmitted the crime of adultery with one of
the same women named in

the other indictment,on the 14th,

of May,1888.
The defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge
of unlawful cohabitation,and when arraigned on the charge
of adultery,entered a plea of former conviction. This
plea was over-ruled. He pleaded not guiltyand was convicted of the crime of adultery. Sentence was pronounced
in each case,and after Nielson had served his term in th2
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Penitentiary

the judgment

and satisfied

against him for

unlawful cohabitationhe applied for a writ of habeas
corpusclaiming that he had been twice convicted for the
same offense;that he had paid the full penalty of the 1-w
and was now being punished twice for one and the same offense. The writ was denied,and an appeal taken to the
Supreme Court of the United States,where
the offense

it was h31ld that

of unlawful cohabitation was a continuing one

up to the time that

the indictment was found.,and

subject

only to one prosecution.
Mr.

Justice

Bradley,delivering

the opinion of the

Court, said:
"True,in the case of Snow,we held that
necessary to prove sexual
out

intercourse

in

a case of unlawful cohabitation;that

as man and wife was sufficient;but

this

it

was not

order to make
living together
was

only because

proof of sexual intercourse would have been merely cuvnulative

evidence of the fact.

wife

is

tion

under the statute.

what we decided was meant

intercourse.
tery

Living togother as man and

And this

charged in

and was included

by unlawful cohabitant-i

Of course that includes
was the integral part

sexual

of the adul-

the second indictment,and was covered by
in

the first

indictment

and conviction."
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In

the case of Morey v.

Conmnonwoalth,

108 Mass.,Mr.

Justice Grey lays down the following proposition,rhich
accords with the decision in this; case:
Ueing

"A conviction of

a corion seller of' intoxicating liquors ha3 been

held to bar a prosecution for a single sale of such liquors .,ithin the same time,upon the ground that tie lasser offense,which

is

full- proved by evidence of the mere

fact of unlawfully making a salelis merged in the greater
offense;but an acquital of the offense of being a common
seller does not have the like effect,"
In that case the court held that a conviction for
le'vdlv and

lasciviously associating and cohabiting with

a certain f er.iaio to whorn he was not married,would not bar
prosecution on an indictmant for several acts of adultery
committed during the aame period of time eimibraced in

the

former,on th3 ground that different evidence was required
to support a conviction in each case."The test is, not
whether the defendant has already beeactbut whether he has been put in

tried for the same

jeopardy for tle

same

offenses"
& pare
Ir.

Hans Nielson,

this case it

131 U.S,,

176-.

was held that where a court

is

with-

out authority to pass a particular sentence,siich sentence
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is

vuJid and the defendant

imprisoned under it

may be dis-

charged on habeas corpus. A judgment in a criminal case
denying to a prisoner a constitutional rifht,or

inflict-

ing an unconstitutional penalty,ie void and m-y be discharged on habeas corpus.
When the Territory of Utah was organized,the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was a de facto co",poration,existing under an ordinance of the provisional
government of the State of Deseret.

In

1885,the Legisla-

tive Assembly of the Territory of Utah validated the ordinance incorporating tho Church.
By the acL of Congress of July lst,'1b62,before referred to,Congres3 disapproved so much of the act incorporating said Church as tended to .establish,maintain,
protect or countenance the practice of polygamy",and prohibted religious and charitable corporations and associations fj'om acquiring or holding mlore than V50,O00.

'worth

of real estate.
The act of Congress of March 3rd,1887,entitled "An
act to amend an act entitled 'An act to amend section 52,,
53 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,in reference to bigamy and for
1882", provided:

other purposes,aproved March 2'2n,
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"That the acts of the L.gislative Assembly of th;
Territory of Utah incorporatingcontilnuilng or providing
for the corporation known as the Church of Jesus

Christ

of Latter-day Saints,and thr3 ordinance of the so called
General Assembly of the Statre of Deseret incorporating
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,so far as
the same may now have legal force and validity are hereby
disapproved and annulle4,and the said corporation, in
far

as

it

may no,, have or pretend to have any legal

so
ex-

istence is hereby dissolved."
The same act made it

the duty of the Attorney Gener-

al of the United States to conmmence proceedings in the
Supreme

Court of Utah

"to wind up the affairs

of said

corporation conformably to Law",and also, 'o institute
proceedings to forfeit and escheat to the United States
property held in violation of the act of Congress of July
lst,1862,above referred to.
In June 1887,a suit was instituted on behalf of the
United States against the late

corporation of the Clhurch

Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and its trustees,praying for the a-flfintment

of a receiver to take charge of

the assets,property and effects of the corporation,and to
hold the same subject to such disposition as the court
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might make of them;for a decree declaring the charter of
tho corporation of th

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-

day Saints dissolved and gnnullqeand fo' all necessary
orders and dacrees to wind up the affair,- of the corporation conformably to law and equity.
The defendants ir

this suit clairned that the act of

Congress was unconstitutionalin so far as it attempted
to annull the charter or dissolve the 2hurch corporation,
because the said charter was an executed contract which
could not be impaired.,and the act was in the nature of a
legislative decree of dissolution.
Members of the Church intervened and claimed that if
the corporationi had been legally dissolved,the Church,as
an unincorporated body,was entitled to the property of
the corporation.
The Supreme Court of thr Territory of Utah held that
the act of Congress was constitutional and decreed that
the corporation was dissolved. It also adjudged the personal property of the corporation,which wa3 of the value
of nearly half a million Dollars,forfeited and escheated
to the United States,because "the doctrine of polygamy o-plurality of wives was one of the doctrine3,teachings and
practices of the corporation.

'

,

The real estate had all been seized by the recciver,.
but the temple and tabernacle used by said sect for the
worship of God were set apart to tho Church for that purpose,the remainder of the realty being e~cheated to the
United States including a piece of land acquired in 1847
when Salt Lake City was first laid out.
Thils case was taken to the Supreme Court of the
Unite- States,vrhere the decision of the lowier court was
affiri-ed so far as it

upheld the act of Congress and de-

creed the dissolution of the Church corporation,but was
modified in reference to the disposition of the personal
property,Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Field and Lamar dissenting.
Tha late corporation of the Church of
Jesu- CI-Iit of Lattgr-dFy Saints et
'alVUnliad, States
130 U.S. 27-50.
140 U.S. 665.
On the question as to what disposition should be
made of the propertythe court says: "When a business
corporation instituted fo-' the purpose of -ain or private
interestis

dissolved,the modern doctrine is

property,after pannent of its
its

stockholders.

that its

debts,equitably belongs to

But this doctrine has never been ex"

tended to public or charitable corporations.

As to these

34.

the ancient

and setablished rule prevailsnamely:that

,:hen a corporation is dissolved,its personal prop .rty,
like that of a man dying without hoirs,ceases to be the
subject of private ownership,and becomes subject to th3
disposal of the sovereign authority,whilst its real estate
reverts or escheats to the grantor or donorunless some
ot:ler course of devolution has bean directed b" positive
law,though still subjectas we shall hereafter see,to the
charitable use."
The pleadings and findings of fact

showi that all of

said Property was donated for religious and charitable
uses. Following a rabid denunciation of the Mormon ChurcN,
its aims and objects,particularly as to the practice of
polyrgamy,which the eminent jurist characterizes as its
principal object,he proceeds to show that the property
so held should not be used for the furtherance of an unlawful practice or design. After citing casEoG from the
Pandects of Justinian dowvn to the present time,and laying
down the well established Cy pres doctrine as applicable
to the case at barthe courtthrourh Mr. Justice Bradley,
says:
"These authorities are citel

(and -any more might be

adduced) for the purpose of' showiing that where property
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has been devoted to a public or charitable use,.vhich cannot be carried out on account of some illegality inore

failure of,the object,it does not,according to the genoral laws of charities,revert to the donor or hi.3 heirs,or
other representatives,but is applied under the direction
of the courts ,ojr

of the supreme power in tiLe State,to

other charitable objects,lawful in their character,but
corresponiding as nearly as may be to the origihal intention of the donor."
The mo-st
that

irriortant question involved in the case was

regarding the constitutionality of the act of Con-

gress anulling the charter of the Church. It was upon
this point that the distinguished Chief Justice and two
of the associate justices dissented. The court says:
"The power of Congress over the Territories of the
United States is general and plenary,arising from and incidental to the right to acquire the territory itselfand
from the power ,iven by the constitution to make all needfLtl rules and regulations respecting the territory or
other property belonging to th e United States. It would
be absurd to hold that the United States has power to acquire territory and no po'.er to govern it wvhen acquired.
The power to acquire territory,other !han the territory
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Northwest of the Ohio Riv-r,(which belonged to the United
States at tine adoption of

th

dLrived

Constitution),is

making power and the po':Tr

fro.,. the treaty

to declare

carry on war. The incidents of these power,3

ind

are those of

national sovereigIJty,and belong to all governmonts. The
power to make acquisitions

of territory

by Congress,b'

treaty and by cession,is an incident,of national sov!reig',ity., x x x The propositions are so elementary,and so
follow
necessarilyAfrom t!,e condition of things arising upon the
acquisition of new territory,that
to supcort

them.
Am.

they need no argument

They aj-e self-evident."

Ins.

Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet.

511,542.

Benner v. Porter,9 Ho-v. 235,242.
Nat.

Bank v.

Murphyr v.

Yankton,lO1

U.S.

129.

Ramsey,114 U.S. 15,44.

Holding that there was no, question that tue acts

of

July lst,1862,and March 3rd,1887,were both valid exercise
of Congressional power,Chief Juistice Fuller,in the dissenting opinio.- of the minority of the court,says:
"Congress possesses such authority over the Territo-?-is

s th

Constitution expressly or by clear inprlica-

tion delegates. Doubtless territory may be acquired by
the direct action of Congress,as

in the annexation of
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Texas;by treaty,as in the case of Louisiana;or,as in ti'e
case of Califrrnia,bv- conquest e.nd afterljrarri b)r treaty;
but th,

po;vler of Congress to legislate over the Territo-

ries is grantect in so many

words b r t _e Constittion.

Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2.
"And it is
shall

further thereIn provided that

have power to make all

laws which shall

'Congress
be nec-:; s-

ary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing
powers,and all other powers vested by this constitution
in

the government

ment or officer

of th

United Statesor

ih

any depart-

thereof'.'

"In my opinion Congress is restrainednot merely by
the limitations expressAd in the Constitutionbut also
by the absence of any grant of powerexpress or implied,
in that

instrumentv And no such power as that involved in

the act

of Congress under consideration is conferred by

the Constitutionnor is any clause pointed out as its
legitimate source. I retard it of vital consequence that
absolute power should never be conceded as belonging,under our system of governmentto any one of ito departments. The legislative po,,,er of Congress

is

delegated and

not inherent,and is therefore linitedo I agree that the
pourer to make needful rules and regulations for the Ter-
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ritories necessarily comprehends th? power to suppress
c,'ime;and it is immaterial,even thoug h that crime assumes
the form of a relig[ious belief or creod.
powe'

to extripate polygamy in

Congress has th,

any of the Territories,by

the eactment of a criminal code directed to that end;
bu'.

it is not authorized under the cover of that power to

seize and confiscate the property of personsindividuals
or corporations,wvithout office found,because they may
have boon guilty of criminal.practices.9
"The doutrine of Cy pres is one of construction and
not of admiistrationf- By it a fund devoted to a particular charity is applied to a cognate purpose,and if the
purpose for which this property was accumulated was such
as has been depicted,it cannot be brought within the rule
of application to a purpose as nearly as possible resembling that denounced. Nor is there here any counterpart
in congressional power to the exercise of the royal prerogative in the disposition of a charity. If this proper-

ty was accumulated for j:, poses declared illegal,that
does not justify its arbitrary disposition by 'Judicial
legislation. In my judgmentits diversion under this act
of Congress is in controvention of specific limitations
in the Constitution;unauthorized,expressly or by implica-
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tion,by any of its

provisions;and

in

diL

gaird of the

fundamental principle that the legislative
United Stites
this

rrpublicis

as exercised by the agents
deler7ated and not

The privelege of the -rritof
o

trial

bills

power of the
of the people of

inherent."
habeas

by jury,tt.he prohibition against

corpus,th

right

the passage of

of attainder or ex post facto laws,o-

laws respect-

ing the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,or' abridging the freedom of speech,or
the pressor depriving any person of life,liberty or property,without

due process of law,or denying to any person

the equal protection of the law,are secvred and recognized by the express provisions of the Constitution. And it
is equally well established by the decision of the Snprei.ie Court
no law

of the United States that

Congress can pass

impairing t1e obligation of contractsor

legislate

back to the government property that has been given away
by actj of Congress,or divest title of property from one
citizen and give it to another,because such acts are repugnant to the spi-'it of our iistitutions.
The Territory of Utah,bT virtue of the Organic
of 1850,becanie a political
In

organization

--

Act

a body politic.

one sense it might be likened to a municipalityand as
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such had power to act through a Legislative Assembly and
a

Governor.

tives

Their,for the time being,'wre the represent?-

of the political

organization,and

rower to act for the interests
the Territory.
improvemnt

the inhabitants of

They coulK,, pass laws for the opening and

of highways,for the organization of militia,

for the support

and gove'nment

building of jails
iV be claimed that,if
ernment

of all

as such they haL

of common schoolsfor

and periteetiariesand

it

the L -islative

the performance

a contract

disapproving such an act,after

the contracting

side such a contract* And the Supreme
of the Territorial

same as that which counties
and that

and set a-

C :u: t has said that

government

is

much the

bear to the respectiv?

Congress may legislate

wIith a

q simple de"

party had performed services under it,annull

the relation

-

of any public service,

the Oongres_- of the United States could,bj
claration

could scarc

Assembly and gov-

should,by ordinance or law,make

an individual foa

the

States,

fo:- them as a State does

for its municiple or anizations. And yet it could not be
claimed that

,hen a municiple

ated by a State Legislaturevesting
ers under which that municiple
tracts

with individuals

organization had been creit

.,ith

certain pow-

organization had made con-

ur corporationstherefore,because
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the State Government

a munic-

was

it

organization -r!hile

contract made b r such municiple
in

3uch

could also impair the obligations of

organizationit

iple

abolish

might entirely

being.
In

Court says:

718,the Supreme

99 u.s.

sinking fund cases,

th

"The United State: cannot,any more than a
for legitimate

with private rigm-t s, ,xcept

Stateinterfere

gove'>miental purroses.

They are not included within the

prohibition which prevents

constitutional
pawiing laws

impairing

States from

;ho obligation of contractsbut,

equally with the States,they are prohibited from detprivin,

persons

or corporations

of propertv w!1ithout due pro-

cess of law. Tha UniLed States are as much bound by their
contracts as are individuals.
lihatiors,it

is

If

as much repudiationL,with

all

the wrong

and reproach that the term implies,as it1 would b3 if
repudiator had been a Stateor

ob-

they repudiate their

the

a imunicipality,or a citi-

zun."
Similar quotations from numerous cases might
would space permit.
Murphy v.

Raimey,

114 U.S.

44.

Dartmouth College Cases,4 Wheat .637.
Miller v.

State,

15 Wal.

488.

be made
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Railroad v.

Church,

98 U.S.

108.

Petinoylvania College Cases,3 Wal.212.
St.P"it.Cath.Cong. v. The German Oath.
104 Ill. 440.

Cong.

Holyroke v. Lyman, 15 Wal. 500.
In
might b

these and mant

other cases,to which rferenco

mad3,the courts held that,in

order to give the

Legislature power to repeal,alter or amend a charter of
incorporation,tL ere must be either
in

the charter itselfor

an express

reservation

some provision of 11h,) general

law or of the Constitution,on the subject of corporations,
which reserved this

power to the L-'J islature

and,so far

as I have been able to discover,there is no case w,:hich
maintains a

contrary doctr-ine.

The general power vested

in all Legislative bodies to repealalter or amend laws
of a general nature does not give thxrn power to alter and
amend a

charter of inco-poration.

State,when
,

a contr.ct,occupie3

the

tracting

an individual citizen

party that

ame relatioi

Th.

it

iakes

other con-

to th

of the State

occupies in making a contract with another citizen. If it
reserves the power to alter,a contract may be altered,
otherwise not.
It

was contended that

t1,e charter of th-

oration had received th? implied sanction

Church corp-

of Congress

43o

bY th-e act of its

inco-l-iuration being allowed to remain

on the Statute Books of the Territory without disapproval,
f'om 1855 to 1887,there being in force during all of said
a law which rxquirr
transmit

the S-.oretary of ti.

to the President

Territory to

of tLe Senate and the speaker

of the House of Representativ:-s,for thi use of Congress,
t"11o copies of the laws and journals of each session of
the Territorial Legislature,within thirty days after th'
end of each sessionand ona copy to th2 President of the
United StaLes. After a reasonable time had elapsedCongress could not impair the contract nor dissolve th3
corporation,either b- disaplproving the act of incorpor.tionor by repealing the charter. In the case of Clinton
v. Englebrecht, 13 Wal. 446,t;.e courtspeaking of the
jury law applicable to the Territory of Utah,saya:
"In th.. first place we observe that the law has received the implied sanction of Congre;s. It was adopte d
in

!59.

it

has b .en

twelve yrars.
soon after

It

on the Statute Book for

iaore than

must have b en transmitted to Congress

it,was enacte d,for it

was tie

retary of the Territory to transmit

auty of tie

Sec-

to that body copi,.,

of all laws on or before the first of thl

n, xt D.combor

in each year, The simple disappi'oval by Congress at an-,

"I14o

tim

could have annulled it@ It is no unreasonable in-

ferrnce therefore that it was approved by that body.'
Conceding that Congress had the power to disapprove
the charter of the Church and dissolve the corporation,
thenunder previous decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United Statesthe property would seem to belong to the
members of the corporation. In the case of Greenwood v
Freight Company, 105 U?S? 199the court,throuigh Mr. Justien Mill~r, says :

"Personal and real property acquired b- the corporation during its lawful cxistence,rights of contract or
choses in action so acquired,and which do not in their
nature depnd upon the general polvrs conferred by the
charterare not destroyed bv such repeal;and the court
may,if the Legislature does not provide somr

special rem-

edy,enforce" such

'i'ht s by tiie means within their porrer.

Tho rights,of th

shareholders of such a corporation to

their interest in its propertv,,are not annihilated bT
such a rep, al,and there must remain in the corts

a power

to rrotect t! o~e ri'9.ts."
The lan-uage of 1h, court
nizo.

abov,

quotedclearly

rcog-

the right of the members of a dissolved corporation

to its prop 3rty,and,altnough it was use~d 'ith

reforenc,;
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to a business corporation,it is difficult to see -711y thi
same principl. should hot apply to reli 7ious and cllaritable or.-anizations. In .ecit seems repugneit to tne
whole tiheory of our government
publican institutions
cate and

sch~at

and to the genius of re-

to permit the governument
th:

prophrtv of such a

to confis-

dissolved corpo-

rat ion*
This was cl.arly expressed by thi

Supreme Court

i

the case oi Terrett v. Tvlor 9 Cranch, 50. In many respects this Utah case is very similar to t1hat.

Th3 Legis-

latur! of Virginia,b- statute passed in 1798,attempted
to disinco-rorat-e the Episcopal Churches in that
repealing all statutes pas

Stateby

-d for their benefit previous

to that time,upon the ground that they were inconsistent
with ti-i.

principles of tlhe State constitution and of re-

ligious freedom, claiminpi that all the property ac juirce'
by the Episcopal Chiir31.es
State of rir-t
over _eers

in ali th2 parishes oL the

belonged to the Stateand

o- th,

poo

-

in

each pariDi

directing tie
to sell

the property

and appropriate t .e proceeds to the use of the poor of
the parish. In. deliv,'rili
Justice Story

u!tivvl

such cases,and says:

the opinion of the Court,Mr.
rx,±
r~riews
the law- r3lating to
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fact,and in

"The property was in

beneficencea

oi, acquired br tI2

chased br the parishoners

there'to was indIefas-

of the pious donor;,and the title
ibly vested in

1aw,gener'lly pur-

the churche,.

x x x A p 'ivate corporation

created by the Legislature may lose its

byr a

franchises

misuse or nonuse of them, md they may be resumed by the
government

by a judicial

ascertain and enforce
law of the land,and is

judgment

upon quo warranto

the forfeiture.
a taci'.

This

can repeal statutes

the coflnion

condition annexed to the

creation of every such corporations x x x
Legislature

is

to

But

t!

creating private

.-t

thle

corpora-

tions or confirming to them property already acquired
under the faith

of previous laws,and by such repeal can

vest the property of such corporations

exclusively in

dispose of the same to such purposes

State,or

please without the consent

or cefault

the

as they may

of the corporators,

%%e ar2 not prepared to adniit,,and we think ourselves
standing upon the principles of natural justice,upon the
fundamental laws of every free government ,upon the spirit
and letter of the Constitution of the United Statesand
upon the decisions of most respectable judicial tribunals,
in

resisting such a doctrine."
It

would seem that objection urged against giving
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would

}ractice,was not valid,

ba used to maintain an illegal
because

it

ni;ers of the churches,that

tile property to th.

t:he property had been contributed for various

religious

and charitable uses,and,if

illegal,the

one of the use-

court could and should prohibit

that purpoiie
strictlr

its

use fo,'

and confine the use to purposes that

legal.

This doctrine

blr the Supreme Court

is

fully

was

11ore

and ably discussed

of Massechviusett$

in

the case of

Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 59;9 Mr. Justice Grey,in
delivering the opinion of tlhe courtsays:
"The

intention of the donor is

the guide --

in

the

phrase of Lord Coke,'The lodastone of the Court',and
therefore,whenever a charitable gift

can be administered

accordin

is

court

to its

express

of Chancery

in

directio,,tl

court,like

Englandi.3 not at liberty

the
to modify

it upon consideration of policy or convenience. But there
are c-ses wiheie the charitable
ed as directed in

extent

could not be execut-

which the testator's

the will,in

has been varied by t'.e court

trust

in

as could not be done in

scheme

such a way and to such an
tl e ce

of a p1iv-?te

trust."
The Mormon Church case was
Court of Utahwith

sent back to the Supreme

instructions to have the personalty
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that belonged to ti-e church corporation at the tinm

of

its dissolution applied to such charitable uses,lawful
in their character,as may most nearly correspond to those
purposes to which ilt was orijinally destined. A master
was appointed to devise such a scheme. The authorities of
the circh asked to have the income arising from the fund
devoted to the support of the poor of the church,and to
the erection and mainten-nce of houses of worship fo- its
members. The government opposed this,scheme on the ground
thatrthese were some of the identical uses for w,hich the
property had been contributedand the order of the court
required that a similar purpose,but not the same purpose,
must b - selected. Upon this theory the master adopted the
scheme propoled b-' the government,and recominended that
the property be given to the public schools of the Territory. He found as a fact,howeverfrom testimon-r taken,
"that since the rendition of the decree in';thIs casethe
practice of polygamy has been abandoned by the church.
Exceptior's nver,

filed to this reportand it is now pend-

ing in the Supreme Court of Utah.
As the property was taken away from the church because of ths practice of polygamnand that institution
had been abandoned,there would seem to be no good reason
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why it

should not be resto-'ed to the lawful uses for

which it

was contributed, instead of bini- devoted to a

purpose foreign to the intention of the donorsin which
!ho nev~r contributed anything to the
those --

the public --

fund and are not even members of the church -- will be
the beneficiaries.
In conclusion, I quote from the congressional report
of the Committee on Territories of the House-of Representativesmade April 1st,

1892,after exhaustive hearings,

as showing present conditions in Utah.
The Committeeafter quoting voluminously from the
testimony taken by it,says: "In the face of such evidence
as this,the witnessesincluding all classes of Gentiles
and Mormonsboth official and unofficial,Gnere can no
longer be a question as to the status of polygamy in the
Territory. That institution has been abolished forever,
and t!e laws relating to it are as strictly obeyed ir
Utah as in anv other Territory or in an, State of the
Union. x x x

*

"Your committee is thorou..ly satisfied of Utah's
entire qualification for acmission into the Unionwith
all the powers of full Statehood. x x x

. The satisfac-

tion which your committee has expressed iswe think,

50.

.:Iiich

fully justified by, the facts and statistics
in

hibitu.

are ex-

this reportand certainly by the hearings

which took place in the conmmittee roomwhich h3arings
have been printed in

full. Utah is

shown to be enormously

rich in natural resources,many of which have been greatly
developedbut the most of which lie dormant,avaiting th?
touch of enterprise which needs only the assurance of a
government of the people,br the people,to lay hold of the
\voltL

rhich nature has provided.

Th

people of the Ter-

ritory,on the farms,in the mines,and in the cities and
towns,have,in spite of much repression,mad-e
,ealthy,and refined conmmunity,,riich,in
of Ameoricem

all

a Strong,
the essentialj

citizenship,is fairly comparable to any other

community of equal population ,,rithin our border."
This I dJean
ritory and h r

a just tribute to the flourishing Ter-

loyal citizens.

